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Abstract
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powered incentive contracts. This creates a seemingly negative rela-
tionship between e¤ort and performance pay.
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1 Introduction
Standard economic models predict a positive relationship between e¤ort and
performance pay. In contrast, there is a range of sociological and psycho-
logical studies that focus on all the problems that performance pay creates.
Some studies even suggest that performance pay can be detrimental to e¤ort
(see Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra and Shaw, 1998, for an overview). The negative
e¤ects of so-called New Public Management (NPM) are often emphasized.
NPM describes reforms in the public sector that are characterized by an
emphasis on output control, performance related pay and introduction of
market mechanisms. Scholars argue that NPM undermines - or crowd out -
intrinsic motivation and thus the e¤ort of public servants, see e.g. Weibel,
Rost, Osterloh (2010), and Perry, Engbers and Jun (2009).
This incentive puzzle has gained inquisitive interest from economic the-
orists. The common denominator of the di¤erent theoretical approaches is
that non-monetary motivation is treated as a variable as opposed to a xed
attribute.1 Standard economic theory acknowledges that agents have non-
monetary motivation, but it is treated as a xed entity. Once non-monetary
motivation is allowed to vary, higher monetary rewards may reduce non-
monetary motivation to such an extent that e¤ort is reduced.
In this paper we show that variations in enforcement probability can
have similar e¤ects as variations in intrinsic motivation, and we argue that
the former can be an alternative explanation for a negative association be-
tween performance pay and e¤ort. If there is a probability v 2 (0; 1) that
an incentive contract is enforced, and this probability is treated as a variable
rather than as a xed parameter, then higher monetary rewards in the in-
centive contract may be associated with a lower probability of enforcement.
1Recent papers show how the structure of monetary rewards may undermine incentives
for social esteem (Benabou and Tirole, 2006, and Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008), a¤ect
agentsinternal rewards from norm adherence (Sliwka, 2007), or a¤ect agentsperception
of their tasks or own abilities (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). See Frey and Regel (2001) for
a review of previous literature on motivation crowding out.
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This may lead to reduced e¤ort.
We concentrate on informal contract enforcement. Informal enforcement
is often modelled as a repeated game where contract breach is punished, not
by the court, but by the contracting parties themselves who can refuse to
cooperate or trade with each other after a deviation. But informal enforce-
ment can also be due to moral or social commitment. Greif (1994) denes
moral enforcement as enforcement based on the tendency of humans to de-
rive utility from acting according to their values, while social enforcement
is related to social sanctions. In this paper, we assume that contracts are
not enforceable by the court of law, but that there is a probability v 2 (0; 1)
that the principal feels morally or socially committed to honor the contract.
Moreover, we assume that the principal learns whether or not she will actu-
ally honor the contract after the contract is o¤ered. There are two possible
justications for this. One is that the principal may learn ex post about the
contractual environment, for instance to which extent social or reputational
concerns matter for the given contractual relationship. Another possibility is
that the principal learns about her own type after observing her own contract
o¤er and the agents actions.
Now, why should improved enforcement, i.e. higher probability that the
principal honors the contract, lead to lower-powered incentive contracts? At
the outset one might expect the opposite. No incentive contract can be
implemented in a situation where the principal certainly wont pay. And
high-powered incentives can certainly be enforced if the contract is honored
for sure. Also, risk aversion on the part of the agent can make it quite
costly for the principal to o¤er incentives where very high bonuses are paid
with low probability, as the agent must be compensated for the high risk
associated with such schemes. However, it turns out that on the margin, the
incentive intensity of the contract can be negatively related to the probability
of enforcement under quite standard assumptions.
We show this in a simple moral hazard model where a principal must
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provide an agent with incentives to exert e¤ort, and where the incentive
contract is honored with a probability v. We deduce the optimal incentive
contract and study how exogenous variations in v a¤ect incentive provision.
Exogenous variations in informal contract enforcement occur across countries
and industries, but can also a¤ect a given contractual relationship via orga-
nizational or institutional reforms. Both the environments for reputational
enforcement, and the conditions for social and moral commitment may vary.
As an example of the latter, it is shown in several experiments that commu-
nication facilitates trust and trustworthiness. In particular it is shown that
stated promises increases the likelihood of trustworthy behavior (Elllingsen
and Johannesson, 2004, Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). One would thus
expect stronger moral enforcement in environments where the principal can
easily communicate with the agent
We rst adopt the classical model on risk sharing vs. incentives (e.g.
Holmström 1979), and show that when enforcement is probabilistic, then
under certain conditions contractual incentive intensity and e¤ort are nega-
tively related. We then show that a similar result can also be obtained under
risk neutrality and limited liability. This negative relationship is a "false
crowding out e¤ect" since total monetary incentives, which is the product
of the enforcement probability and contractual incentives, is positively re-
lated to e¤ort. But since the enforcement probability does not show up in
the incentive contract, it appears that incentives and e¤ort are negatively
related.
To see the intuition, note that if the enforcement probability increases,
this has a positive e¤ect on e¤ort, but it also increases expected wage costs
per unit of e¤ort since the probability that the principal actually has to pay
as promised increases. In order to reduce wage costs, the principal can simply
reduce expected contractual wage payments. Hence, e¤ort increases, but the
contractual incentives are lower-powered. And the other way around: Weaker
enforcement induces lower e¤ort since the probability that the agent actually
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is paid decreases. In order to mitigate the reduction in e¤ort, the principal
can thus provide higher-powered incentives.
This result has an important empirical implication: When observing a
negative relationship between performance pay and e¤ort, one has to control
for the probability that incentive contracts are actually honored. If not, one
may wrongfully infer that monetary incentives crowd out non-monetary mo-
tivation. Controlling for enforcement probability is quite easy in experimental
work.2 In empirical work, however, this is much more of a challenge. Take
New Public Management (NPM) as an example. As noted, many scholars
argue that NPM undermines intrinsically motivated e¤ort. But if NPM actu-
ally undermines e¤ort (which of course is debatable, see Stazyk, 2010), would
this necessarily come from crowding out of intrinsic motivation? Important
aims of NPM include decentralization of management authority, more dis-
cretion and exibility, less bureaucracy and less rules. These institutional
changes may a¤ect both the legal and the informal enforcement environment.
The crux is that enforcement and contractual incentives may be substi-
tutes. In that sense our paper is related to models showing the substitutabil-
ity between explicit contracts and informal relational contracts (see Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy, 1994, and Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995). In these
models, improved explicit contracts may reduce feasible incentive pay under
relational contracting, but e¤ort is still positively related to the sum of con-
tractual incentives. In contrast, we nd that e¤ort may be negatively related
to contractual incentives.
With respect to the modelling, a contribution of the paper is to con-
sider probabilistic enforcement in an otherwise standard moral hazard model
with risk aversion or limited liability. In the classic moral hazard models (e.g.
Holmström, 1979), perfect enforcement is assumed, while in models of incom-
plete contracting, it is commonly assumed that contracting is prohibitively
2There are a few of laboratory and eld experiments documenting a negative causal
relationship between e¤ort and monetary incentives (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997;
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, and Fehr and Gachter, 2002).
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costly so that legal enforcement is impossible (starting with Grossman and
Hart, 1986).3 The way we model probabilistic enforcement is also novel. We
adopt the general idea from the incomplete contracting literature that neces-
sary information is realized ex post. In the seminal papers by Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and More (1990), the principal (buyer) learns about
her needs ex post. In our setting, the principal learns about the contractual
environment or her own type ex post. 4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic
model. In Section 3 we study variations in enforcement probability under
risk aversion and limited liability, respectively. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a relationship between a principal and an agent, where the agent
produces output x for the principal. Output is a random variable (x 2 X),
and the agents e¤ort a a¤ects the probability distribution (density) f(x; a).
E¤ort costs are given by C(a), where C 0(a) > 0, C 00(a) > 0, C(0) = 0. We
assume that output is observable to both parties, but that the agents e¤ort
level is unobservable to the principal, so the parties must contract on output:
the principal pays a wage w(x) = s+ (x) where s is a non-contingent xed
salary and (x) is a contingent bonus ( (x) < 0 implies a contingent ne).
We assume that the principal is risk neutral, but allow the agent to be risk
3However, imperfect enforcement is increasingly recognized as an important ingredient
in models of contractual relationships. Some papers focus on the relationship between
ex post evidence disclosure and enforceability (Ishiguro, 2002; Bull and Joel Watson,
2004), while others focus on the relationship between ex ante contracting and enforceability
(Battigalli and Maggi, 2002, Schwartz and Watson, 2004, Shavell 2006). There is also a
growing literature on the interaction between legal imperfect enforcement and informal
(relational) enforcement, see Sobel (2006), MacLeod (2007), Battigalli and Maggi (2008)
and Kvaløy and Olsen (2009, 2012).
4The latter bears some resemblance to the literature on will-power and self-control
where people learn about their own type from previous actions (see e.g. Benabou and
Tirole, 2003)
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averse, with a utility function u(w):
We assume that contracts are not enforceable by the court of law, but that
there is a probability v 2 (0; 1) that the principal feels (morally or socially)
committed to honor the contract. Consider then the following stage game  :
1. The principal o¤ers a contract w(x) = s + (x) to the agent. If the
agent rejects the o¤er, the game ends. If he accepts, the game continues
to stage 2.
2. The agent takes action a and realizes output x.
3. Nature draws. With probability v the principal nds herself committed
to pay the bonus (x).
4. The principal observes x, pays s and chooses bonus payment ~(x) =
(x) if she is committed to honor the contract, and ~(x) = 0 if not.
A crucial assumption here is that the principal learns whether or not she
will actually honor the contract after the contract is o¤ered. As noted, there
are two possible justications for this. One is that the principal may learn
about the contractual environment in stage 3, for instance to which extent
social or reputational concerns matter for the given contractual relationship.
Another possibility is that there are two types of principals, one that honors
and one that reneges on promises, and the principal learns about her own
type in stage 3 of the game.
3 Incentives and enforceability
We will now deduce the optimal contract and discuss variations in enforce-
ment probability v. We will rst assume that the agent is risk averse. We
will then analyze the case where both parties are risk neutral but subject to
limited liability.
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3.1 Risk aversion
In stage 2 the game  , the agent chooses e¤ort to maximize his expected
utility, given by
U(a; w; v; s) = v
Z
f(x; a)u(w(x))dx+ (1  v)u(s)  C(a):
(Unless otherwise noted, all integrals are over the support X.) For each
outcome x, the agent gets the payment w(x) = s+ (x) with probability v,
and the payment (xed salary) s otherwise, and this gives expected utility
as specied. Optimal e¤ort satises
Ua(a; w; v; s) = v
Z
fa(x; a)u(w(x))dx  C 0(a) = 0 (IC)
(We will invoke assumptions to make the rst-order approachvalid.)
In stage 1 the principal chooses wages (and e¤ort a) to maximize her
payo¤, subject to the agents choice, represented by IC, and the agents
participation constraint:
U(a; w; v; s)  Uo (IR)
The principal, assumed risk neutral, has payo¤
V (a; w; v; s) =
Z
f(x; a) [x  vw(x)] dx  (1  v)s
Forming the Lagrangian L = V +(U Uo)+Ua, with multipliers  and
 on the IR and IC constraints, respectively, one sees that optimal payments
satisfy
1
u0(w(x))
= + 
fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
;
1
u0(s)
=  (W)
These conditions are standard (Holmström 79), and reect the trade-o¤ be-
tween providing insurance and incentives for the agent. This trade o¤ is
relevant for the performance dependent bonuses, but not for the xed pay-
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ment s. Given a monotone likelihood ratio fa(x;a)
f(x;a)
(MLRP), payments w(x)
will be increasing in output x.
Payments will be chosen to implement the action that is optimal for the
principal, and this entails an action that satises La = 0. The optimal action
and the associated payments (and multipliers) will depend on the parameter
v, i.e. on the level of enforceability.
We now ask, i) will e¤ort increase when the enforcement probability v
increases and ii) may contractual incentives at the same time become weaker?
That is: would the new contractual incentives (corresponding to the higher
v) have induced lower e¤ort under the old v? If so, the new contractual
incentives are weaker, but the associated e¤ort will be higher.
Consider the agents (marginal) incentives for e¤ort; they are given by
vm(a; w), where
m(a; w) 
Z
fa(x; a)u(w(x))dx (M)
Thus m(a; w) is the marginal incentive for e¤ort generated by the contract
w(x) = s+ (x). We call m the marginal contractual incentives.
Consider now ~v > v, and suppose the associated optimal e¤orts satisfy
~a > a. A way to interpret question ii) is then to ask whether m(a; ~w) <
m(a; w), i.e. whether the monetary payments ~w associated with the higher
~v yield in isolation lower marginal incentives for the agent.
Now, optimal e¤ort and payments are functions of v, say a(v) and (with
some abuse of notation) w(v), respectively. We thus ask if m(a; w(v)) is
decreasing in v, i.e. if
@
@v
m(a; w(v)) =
Z
fa(x; a)
@
@v
u(w(x; v))dx < 0
Note that in equilibrium the agents choice of e¤ort will be a = a(v),
and hence we have from incentive compatibility (IC) that vm(a(v); w(v)) =
C 0(a(v)). Di¤erentiating this identity we see that for equilibrium e¤ort a =
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a(v) we have
v
@
@v
m(a; w(v)) =

C 00(a)  v @
@a
m(a; w(v))

a0(v)  C 0(a)=v (1)
From this it follows that if a0(v) > 0 (so e¤ort increases with v), and the
last term dominates the other terms on the RHS (so @
@v
m < 0), then it will
be the case that e¤ort and marginal contractual incentives for e¤ort move
in opposite directions.5 We will in the following provide a specication of
functional forms where this is precisely the case.
Note from (1) and IC (vm = C 0) that the sign of @
@v
m is given by the sign
of 
aC 00(a)
C 0(a)
  a
m(a; w)
@
@a
m(a; w)

va0(v)
a
  1 (2)
Hence the sign is determined by the magnitudes of three elasticities; per-
taining to marginal costs, marginal contractual incentives and equilibrium
e¤ort, respectively. Signing expressions like (1) thus requires properties of
equilibrium e¤ort variations in a moral hazard model. To make this tractable
we consider specic functional forms. Assume the following specications for
the probability distribution and for the agents utility:
F (x; a) = Pr(outcome  xj a) = 1  e x=a, x  0, u(w) = pw (3)
Here the expected output is Ex = a, so higher e¤ort increases expected
output and leads to a more favorable distribution in the sense of rst order
stochastic dominance. The distribution satises MLRP. The utility function
implies constant relative risk aversion ( wu00=u0 = const).
It turns out that the marginal contractual incentives for e¤ort in this case
are constant and independent of e¤ort, i.e. @
@a
m(a; w(v)) = 0. So from (1)
5If on the other hand a0(v) < 0, then (since the square bracket in (1) is positive by
the agents SOC), we will have @m=@v < 0, and thus e¤ort and marginal contractual
incentives moving in the same direction.
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we have here (for a = a(v))
v2
C 0(a)
@
@v
m(a; w(v)) =
vC 00(a)
C 0(a)
a0(v)  1 (4)
Hence we see that if the equilibrium marginal cost C 0(a(v)) is inelastic (as a
function of v) then marginal contractual incentives will be reduced as the level
of enforceability v increases. If at the same time e¤ort increases with higher v,
then clearly e¤ort and contractual incentives will move in opposite directions.
It can be shown (see the appendix) that this will indeed be the case if the cost
function exhibits inelastic marginal costs (aC 00(a)=C 0(a)  1) and moreover
aC 000(a)=C 00(a) >  3. (This holds e.g. for quadratic costs; C(a) = ca2). Thus
we provide a set of conditions where e¤ort increases while the incentives for
e¤ort generated by the contract decrease. (A somewhat more general result
is given in the appendix; see Lemma 2.)
Proposition 1 If functional forms satisfy (3), then e¤ort and contrac-
tual incentives are negatively related if marginal e¤ort costs are inelastic
(aC 00(a)=C 0(a)  1) and aC 000(a)=C 00(a) >  3.
The intuition is as follows. Improved enforceability increases the agents
incentives to exert e¤ort (other things equal), but it also increases the prin-
cipals wage costs per unit of e¤ort (since the probability that the principal
actually has to pay as promised increases). Now, even though the principal
nds it optimal to induce higher e¤ort when v increases, she will make a
trade-o¤ between the benets from higher e¤ort and the expected wage costs
from higher v: She may thus reduce these wage costs by providing lower-
powered incentives. In other words, improved enforcement may crowd out
contractual incentives.
Note that this type of crowding out appears when e¤ort costs are inelastic,
meaning that the agent has a high responsiveness to incentives. The reason is
that improved enforcement increases e¤ort and thus wage costs per unit e¤ort
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to such an extent that the principal nds it optimal to reduce contractual
incentives.
3.2 Limited liability
We will now show that similar results can be obtained under risk neutrality
and limited liability. We assume from now on that the agent is risk neutral
in the sense that u(w) = w, but that he is protected by limited liability so
that w(x)  0. We also assume that the principal has limited means so that
w(x)  x. Hence, it is assumed that the principal cannot commit to pay
wages above the agents value added. This constraint resembles Innes (1990)
who in a nancial contracting setting assumes that the investors (principals)
liability is limited to her investment in the agent. Finally, it is convenient here
to specify that output has support X = [x; x]
Now, the game proceeds as in the previous section, but under risk neu-
trality, the agents expected payo¤ is simply: s+
R x
x
v(x)f(x; a)dx  C(a),
yielding a rst order condition for e¤ort as follows:Z x
x
v(x)fa(x; a)dx  C 0(a) = 0 (IC)
In stage 1, the principal maximizes her payo¤, which isZ x
x
(x  v(x))f(x; a)dx  s;
subject to incentive (IC), participation (IR) and limited liability constraints:
s+
Z x
x
v(x)f(x; a)dx  C(a)  Uo (IR)
x  w(x) = s+ (x)  0
Mainly to simplify notation, we will assume x = 0 and hence that the xed
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salary must be s = 0. By the same argument as in Innes (1990), it then
follows that the optimal wage scheme pays the minimal wage for outcomes
below some threshold, and the maximal wage for outcomes above that thresh-
old ((x) = 0 for x < x00 and (x) = x for x > x
0
0). It is well known that the
discontinuity of this scheme is problematic, and for that reason one requires
continuity and monotonicity. The optimal such scheme also has a threshold
(say x0) and pays (x) = 0 for x  x0 and (x) = x   x0 for x > x0: In
the following we will focus on this kind of (constrained optimal) incentive
scheme. Since the expected marginal payo¤ from exerting extra e¤ort is zero
as long as output is below x0, it is clear that the higher is the threshold x0,
the lower is the incentive intensity of the contract.
Given that the principal cannot extract rent from the agent through the
xed salary component, the IR constraint will not bind unless the agents
reservation utility Uo is large. Mainly to simplify notation we will assume
here that Uo = 0 and hence that this constraint is not binding.
Given the form of the incentive scheme, the expected payment for the
agent is now
v
Z x
x
(x)f(x; a)dx = v
Z x
x0
(x  x0)f(x; a)dx = v
Z x
x0
G(x; a)dx,
where the expression in the last integral follows from integration by parts, and
where G(x; a) = Pr(outcome > xj a) = 1  F (x; a). By a similar calculation
the principals expected payo¤ can be written asZ x
x
xf(x; a)dx  v
Z x
x
(x)f(x; a)dx =
Z x
x
G(x; a)dx  v
Z x
x0
G(x; a)dx (5)
The principals problem is now (for a given v) to choose x0; a to maximize
this payo¤ subject to the agents incentive constraint.
We will focus on cases where higher v is valuable for the principal.6 Note
6If the principal can inuence the verication probability v, e.g. by making costly
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that a higher v is benecial for the principal because it strengthens the agents
incentives, but is on the other hand costly because it increases the total
expected payments (and therefore the rent) to the agent. It turns out that a
higher v is valuable if Ga(x; a) > 0, meaning that more e¤ort yields a shift
to a distribution that is more favorable in the sense of rst order stochastic
dominance. As is well known, this is implied by MLRP.
Again, we analyze the following question: what happens to the optimal
e¤ort (a) and incentive scheme (represented by x0) when v varies? Compar-
ative statics yields the following
Lemma 1 If (in addition to MLRP) we have
@
@a
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)
Ga(x0; a)
dx > 0 (6)
then a0(v) > 0.
As noted before, a improved enforcement increases the agents incentives
to exert e¤ort (other things equal), but it also increases the principals wage
costs per unit of e¤ort. The proposition gives conditions under which the
rst e¤ect dominates in the sense that the principal nds it optimal to induce
higher e¤ort when enforceability increases. But the principal may still want
to mitigate the latter e¤ect, that is to reduce wage costs by providing lower-
powered incentives. The next result shows that this is indeed what will occur,
under some conditions. The following conditions turn out to be su¢ cient:
Gaa(x; a) < 0,
@
@a
Gaa(x; a)
Ga(x; a)
 0 and @
@x
Gaa(x; a)
Ga(x; a)
> 0 (7)
Proposition 2 Suppose that C 000(a)  0 and that G(x; a) in addition to the
assumptions in Lemma 1 satises (7). Then both e¤ort and the threshold
investments (say K(v)) in better contract specications or performance metrics, we will
have @L=@v = K 0(v) in optimum and thus @L=@v > 0 for the relevant level v.
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for the incentive scheme increase with higher enforceability (a0(v) > 0 and
x00(v) > 0), hence higher e¤ort is then associated with lower-powered contrac-
tual incentives.
An example that satises all assumptions is G(x; a) = Pr(outcome >
x) = 1  xa, 0  x  1, (see the appendix).
The proposition demonstrates that higher e¤ort may be associated with
lower-powered contractual incentives (higher x0), and the other way around,
even if there is no motivation-crowding-out.
4 Concluding remarks
We o¤er a simple model where contractual monetary incentives and e¤ort
are negatively related even if there is no crowding out of non-monetary mo-
tivation. The idea is simple: Improved enforcement induces higher e¤ort,
but increases the principals expected wage costs, which can be mitigated
by lower-powered incentives. Or: Weaker enforcement induces lower e¤ort,
which can be mitigated by higher-powered incentives.
Our model is not an alternative to the behavioral models on crowding
out, but a complement. In contrast to (parts of) the crowding out litera-
ture, we do not o¤er a negative causal relationship between incentives and
e¤ort. Instead we identify a spurious relationship where improved contract
enforcement increases e¤ort but "crowd out" contractual incentives. Total
monetary incentives, which is the product of the enforcement probability
and contractual incentives, are positively related to e¤ort, but since the en-
forcement probability does not show up in the incentive contract, it appears
that incentives and e¤ort are negatively related. The empirical implication is
clear: When observing a negative relationship between performance pay and
e¤ort, one has to control for the probability that the relevant incentive con-
tracts are actually enforced. If not, one may wrongfully infer that monetary
15
incentives crowd out non-monetary motivation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
From the Lagrangian L = V + (U   Uo) + Ua, we obtain the following
conditions for optimal bonuses (x), or equivalently payments w(x) = s +
(x):
0 =  vf(x; a) + vf(x; a)u0(w(x)) + fa(x; a)u0(w(x));
and for the optimal xed payment s:
0 =  1+

v
Z
f(x; a)u0(w(x))dx+ (1  v)u0(s)

+v
Z
fa(x; a)u
0(w(x))dx:
The rst is equivalent to 1
u0 =  + 
fa
f
, and substituting from the rst into
the second we get u0 = 1. This proves (W).
For utility u(w) =
p
w we have 1=u0 = 2u, hence the conditions for
optimal payments are
2u(w(x)) = + 
fa(x; a)
f(x; a)
 + h(x; a), 2u(w(s)) =  (8)
where h(x; a) = fa(x;a)
f(x;a)
denotes the likelihood ratio.
Proposition 1 now follows from the lemma below. To state the lemma
dene
M(a) =
Z
fa(x; a)h(x; a)dx (9)
M1(a) =
Z
faa(x; a)h(x; a)dx (10)
N(a) =
Z
fa(x; a)h
2(x; a)dx (11)
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Dene also
p(a) = 2(Uo + C(a))C
0(a) 
Z
xfa(x; a)dx
q(a) = 2

N(a)  2M1(a)
2M(a)
+
C 00(a)
C 0(a)

C 0(a)2
M(a)
Then we have
Lemma 2 Assume u(w) = w 1=2. Then optimal e¤ort satises p(a) +
q(a)=v = 0. If q(a) > 0 then a0(v) > 0. If in addition condition (12)
below holds, then @m
@v
< 0.
C 00(a)
C 0(a)
  M1(a)
M(a)

q(a)=v
p0(a) + q0(a)=v
  1 < 0 (12)
As we will show below, the LHS of (12) coincides with (2). Consider
now Proposition 1. For F (x; a) = 1   e x=a it is straightforward to ver-
ify (see below) that we have M(a) = 1=a2, M1(a) = 0, N(a) = 2=a3 andR
xfa(x; a)dx = 1, and hence that
q(a) = 2

1
a
+
C 00(a)
C 0(a)

C 0(a)2a2
For this distribution, condition (12) in the lemma is thus
aC 00(a)
C 0(a)

q(a)=v
ap0(a) + aq0(a)=v
< 1
Since p0(a) > 0, we see that for inelastic marginal costs this condition holds
if q(a)  aq0(a). This holds if aC000(a)
C00(a)   3 (see below), proving Proposition
1.
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Proof of the lemma. Consider rst the agents marginal contractual
incentive m(a; w), where payments w() are optimal, and thus given by (8)
for the optimal action a = a, say. We then have
m(a; w) =
Z
fa(x; a)u(w(x))dx =
Z
fa(x; a)
+ h(x; a)
2
dx (13)
=
Z
fa(x; a)h(x; a
)dx

2
M(a; a)
2
(14)
where M(a; a) is (with a slight abuse of notation) dened by the identity,
and the third equality follows from
R
fa = 0 (since
R
f = 1).
Note that the agents choice problem is concave if vma(a; w) C 00(a)  0,
which holds if Ma(a; a)  0 and C 00  0, and that the optimal choice of
e¤ort is then given by the FOC vm(a; w) = C 0(a). In equilibrium we have
a = a and thus
C 0(a) = v
Z
fa(x; a)u(w(x))dx = v

2
M(a; a)  v
2
M(a) (15)
Note also from IR (which will be binding) and (8) that we have
Uo + C(a) = v
Z
f(x; a)u(w(x))dx+ (1  v)u(s)
= v
Z
f(x; a) [+ h(x; a)] =2dx+ (1  v)=2 = =2 (16)
where the last equality follows from the fact that
R
fh =
R
f fa
f
=
R
fa = 0.
Hence we see that  = 2(Uo + C(a)).
To characterize the optimal e¤ort for the principal, consider
La = Va + Ua + Uaa
=
Z
fa(x; a) [x  vw(x)] dx+ 0 + (v
Z
faa(x; a)u(w(x))dx  C 00(a))
= e(a)  v
Z
fa(x; a)w(x)dx+ (vma(a; w)  C 00(a)) (17)
18
where we have dened e(a) =
R
xfa(x; a)dx as the marginal value of e¤ort
on output.
Consider the second term in (17). Since u =
p
w we have w = u2, and
substituting from (8) we can writeZ
fa(x; a)w(x)dx =
Z
fa(x; a) ([+ h(x; a)] =2)
2 dx
=
Z
fa(x; a)

2 + 2h(x; a) + 2h2(x; a)

dx=4
= 

2
M(a) +
2
4
N(a) (18)
where the last equality follows from
R
fa = 0 and the denitions ofM(a) and
N(a), see (9) and (11).
We see from (13) and (10) that we (in equilibrium) have ma(a; w) =
M1(a)=2 and hence that (17) can be written as
La = e(a)  v



2
M(a) +
2
4
N(a)

+ (v

2
M1(a)  C 00(a))
Substituting for  from (15) and for  from (16) we obtain the following
condition for optimal e¤ort
0 = La = e(a) 

C 0(a) +
C 0(a)
M(a)

2
N(a)

+ (
C 0(a)
M(a)
M1(a)  C 00(a))
= e(a)  2(Uo + C(a))C 0(a) 

C 0(a)
M(a)
N(a)  2(C
0(a)
M(a)
M1(a)  C 00(a))

C 0(a)
M(a)
1
v
=  p(a)  q(a)1
v
where the last equality follows from the denitions of p(a); q(a) and e(a) =R
xfa.
This shows that optimal e¤ort is given by p(a) + q(a) 1
v
= 0, as stated
in the lemma, and that a0(v) = q(a)=v
2
p0(a)+q0(a)=v . Concavity of the principals
optimization w.r.t. e¤ort requires p0(a) + q0(a)=v > 0, and hence we have
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a0(v) > 0 when q(a) > 0. Substituting for a0(v) in the condition (2) for
@m
@v
< 0 and noting (from (14) and (9)- (10)) that ma=m =M1(a)=M(a), we
see that condition (2) is equivalent to (12) in the lemma. This completes the
proof.
For completeness we nally verify the assertions stated above regarding
the distribution F (x; a) = 1  e x=a. We have here density f(x; a) = 1
a
e x=a
and likelihood ratio h(x; a)  fa(x;a)
f(x;a)
= 1
a
(x
a
  1). Hence
M(a; a) =
Z
fa(x; a)h(x; a
)dx =
Z 1
0
1
a2
e x=a(
x
a
  1) 1
a
(
x
a
  1)dx
=
1
aa
Z 1
0
e y(y   1)(y a
a
  1)dy = 1
(a)2
This shows that M(a) = M(a; a) = 1=a2 and M1(a) = Ma(a; a = a) = 0.
We further have
N(a) =
Z
fa(x; a)h
2(x; a)dx =
Z 1
0
1
a4
e x=a(
x
a
 1)3dx = 1
a3
Z 1
0
e y(y 1)3dy = 2
a3
Finally note that q(a) = 2a (a), with  (a) = (C 0)2 + aC 00C 0 and hence
that aq0(a) = 2a (a) + 2a2 0(a)  q(a) if  0(a)  0. We have  0(a) =
3C 0C 00 + aC 000C 0 + aC 00C 00 > 0 certainly if aC 000=C 00   3. This veries the
stated assertions.
Remark. As another application of the Lemma, one can show that e¤ort
and contractual incentives move in opposite directions (a0(v) > 0; @m
@v
< 0)
for the distribution F (x; a) = xa, x 2 [0; 1] if C 0(a) is su¢ ciently inelastic
and v is su¢ ciently large (close to 1). For this distribution one ndsM(a) =
1
a2
; N(a) =   2
a3
;M1(a) =
 2
a3
(and hence marginal incentives are decreasing
in e¤ort, since ma = M1=2 < 0). Assuming C 0(a) = k = const, we then
nd q(a) = N(a) 2M1(a)
M(a)
k2
M(a)
= 2ak2 and p(a) = 2(Uo+ka)k  1(a+1)2 , and thush
C00(a)
C0(a)   M1(a)M(a)
i
q(a)=v
p0(a)+q0(a)=v =

2
a

2ak2=v
2k2+ 2
(a+1)3
+2k2=v
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= 2 1
v+
v=k2
(a+1)3
+1
! 2 1
2+
1=k2
(a+1)3
< 1 as v ! 1
This shows that the condition in the Lemma is fullled for v close to 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
The principal chooses x0; a to maximize her payo¤ (5) subject to the
agents incentive constraint, which here takes the form
v
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx  C 0(a) = 0 (19)
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L =
Z x
x
G(x; a)dx  v
Z x
x0
G(x; a)dx+ 

v
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx  C 0(a)

(20)
As noted we focus on cases where higher v is valuable for the principal, i.e.
where @L
@v
> 0. Since optimization with respect to the threshold parameter
x0 yields vG(x0; a)  vGa(x0; a) = 0 and hence  = G(x0;a)Ga(x0;a) , we have
@L
@v
=  
Z x
x0
G(x; a)dx+
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx =
Z x
x0

G(x0; a)
Ga(x0; a)
  G(x; a)
Ga(x; a)

Ga(x; a)dx
(21)
We see that we will have @L
@v
> 0 if Ga(x; a) > 0 and the ratio
G(x;a)
Ga(x;a)
is
decreasing in x. Both properties follow from MLRP; we demonstrate the
latter below (at the end of this proof).
Consider now the Lagrangian (20) and write the constraint (19) as
H(x0; a; v)  v
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx  C 0(a) = 0 (22)
The FOCs for optimal choices are Lx0 = La = H = 0. (Subscripts denote
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partials.) Di¤erentiation of these conditions yields264 Lx0x0 Lx0a Hx0Lax0 Laa Ha
Hx0 Ha 0
375
264 x
0
0(v)
a0(v)
0(v)
375 =
264  Lx0v Lav
 Hv
375
and hence the standard comparative statics formulae
x00(v) =
1
D

 Lx0v Lx0a Hx0
 Lav Laa Ha
 Hv Ha 0
 =
1
D

H2aLvx0  HaHx0Lav  HaHvLax0 +HvHx0Laa

a0(v) =
1
D

Lx0x0  Lx0v Hx0
Lax0  Lav Ha
Hx0  Hv 0
 =
1
D

H2x0Lav  HvHx0Lax0  HaHx0Lvx0 +HaHvLx0x0

where
D =

Lx0x0 Lx0a Hx0
Lax0 Laa Ha
Hx0 Ha 0
 =  Lx0x0H2a+2Lax0HaHx0 LaaH2x0 > 0 (SOC)
From FOC we have 0 = Lx0 = vG(x0; a)  vGa(x0; a) and hence
Lvx0 = G(x0; a)  Ga(x0; a) = 0 (23)
Hence we can write
x00(v)D =  HaHx0Lav  HaHvLax0 +HvHx0Laa (24)
a0(v)D = H2x0Lav  HvHx0Lax0 +HaHvLx0x0 (25)
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Writing g(x; a) = Gx(x; a) and using (23) we have
Lx0x0=v = g(x0; a)  ga(x0; a) = g(x0; a) 
G(x0; a)
Ga(x0; a)
ga(x0; a) < 0
where the inequality holds because we have assumed Ga > 0 and it follows
from MLRP (as shown below) that d
dx
Ga
G
= 1
G2
(gaG Gag) > 0.
From (22), Ga > 0 and the SOC for the agent we have
Hx0 =  vGa(x0; a) < 0, Hv =
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx > 0, Ha = v
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx C 00(a) < 0
(26)
These inequalities implyHaHvLx0x0 > 0, and we thus have from (25): a
0(v)D >
[Hx0Lav  HvLax0 ]Hx0.
Since Hx0 =  vGa < 0 we then have a0(v) > 0 if Hx0Lav  HvLax0 < 0.
To show that this condition implying a0(v) > 0 is satised, consider
Hx0Lav  HvLax0 =  vGa(x0; a)

 
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx+ 
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx

 
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx

[vGa(x0; a)  vGaa(x0; a)]
= v

 Ga(x0; a)
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx+Gaa(x0; a)
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx

=  vG2a(x0; a)

@
@a
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)
Ga(x0; a)
dx

< 0
The last inequality follows from the assumption (6) and proves that a0(v) > 0.
It remains to verify the assertion stated after (21) that MLRP implies
that the ratio G(x;a)
Ga(x;a)
is decreasing in x. To this end consider
@
@x
Ga
G
=
1
G2
(gaG Gag) = g
G

ga
g
  Ga
G

(27)
The derivative is positive, and the proof is thus complete, if the last paren-
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thesis is positive. Note that
Ga(x; a)
G(x; a)
=
@
@a
R x
x
g(x0; a)dx0
G(x; a)
=
Z x
x
ga(x
0; a)
g(x0; a)
g(x0; a)
G(x; a)
dx0  ga(x; a)
g(x; a)
 1
where the inequality follows by MLRP (ga(x;a)
g(x;a)
= fa(x;a)
f(x;a)
increasing). Hence
the derivative in (27) is positive, and this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
First note thatGaa < 0 implies Lav =  
R x
x0
Ga(x; a)dx+
R x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx <
0, and hence from (26) that HaHx0Lav < 0. We then have from (24):
x00(v)D =  HaHx0Lav  HaHvLax0 +HvHx0Laa > [ HaLax0 +Hx0Laa]Hv
(28)
Consider [ HaLax0 +Hx0Laa]. Since Ha < v
R x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx by (26), and
since Gaa < 0 implies Lax0 = vGa(x0; a)  vGaa(x0; a) > 0, we have
 HaLax0 +Hx0Laa >  

v
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx

[Ga(x0; a)  Gaa(x0; a)] v + ( vGa(x0; a))Laa
= vGa(x0; a)

 
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx

1  Gaa(x0; a)
Ga(x0; a)

v   Laa

(29)
Consider Laa. Since Gaa < 0 and C 000(a)  0 we have
Laa =
Z x
x
Gaa(x; a)dx  v
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)dx+ 

v
Z x
x0
Gaaa(x; a)dx  C 000(a)

<
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)

1  v + vGaaa(x; a)
Gaa(x; a)

dx
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Hence from (29) we now have
 HaLax0 +Hx0Laa
vGa(x0; a)
>  
Z x
x0
Gaa(x; a)

1 + v

Gaaa(x; a)
Gaa(x; a)
  Gaa(x0; a)
Ga(x0; a)

dx > 0
(30)
where the last inequality will be shown to follow from (7). From (28) and
the fact that Hv > 0 we then see that x00(v) > 0.
To show the last inequality in (30), note that the assumptions in (7) imply
@
@a
Gaa(x; a)
Ga(x; a)
=
Gaa(x; a)
Ga(x; a)

Gaaa(x; a)
Gaa(x; a)
  Gaa(x; a)
Ga(x; a)

 0
and Gaa(x;a)
Ga(x;a)
> Gaa(x0;a)
Ga(x0;a)
when x > x0. These inequalities in turn imply
Gaaa(x; a)
Gaa(x; a)
 Gaa(x; a)
Ga(x; a)
>
Gaa(x0; a)
Ga(x0; a)
when x > x0
This implies that the expression in (30) is positive, and hence completes the
proof that x00(v) > 0.
To illustrate the assumptions stated in Proposition 3, we nally show that
they are all satised by G(x; a) = 1   xa, 0  x  1. For this distribution
we have
Ga(x; a) =  xa lnx > 0
Gx(x; a) =  axa 1 =  f(x; a)
Gxa(x; a) =  fa(x; a) =  xa 1 (a lnx+ 1)
Hence fa(x;a)
f(x;a)
= lnx + 1=a is increasing in x, so MLRP holds. Moreover,
we also have
@
@a
Z x
x0
Ga(x; a)
Ga(x0; a)
dx =
@
@a
Z 1
x0
xa lnx
xa0 lnx0
dx =
Z 1
x0
(
x
x0
)a ln(
x
x0
)
lnx
lnx0
dx > 0
hence the condition stated in Lemma 1 holds.
Next note that
Gaa(x; a) =   ddaxa lnx =  xa(lnx)2 = Ga(x; a) ln x < 0
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and hence that Gaa(x;a)
Ga(x;a)
= ln x. The additional assumptions (7) in Proposition
2 are therefore also satised.
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